Natalie Hsiao and Bill Ramsey, Dept. of Philosophy, UNLV

—Experimental philosophy has exposed several ways in which ostensibly philosophically irrelevant factors influence the sort of intuitive reactions people have to the hypothetical cases that are common in philosophical discourse. However, one potentially important influencing factor that has not been examined is the framing language typically employed to introduce and describe philosophical thought experiments.

Philosophers commonly present and characterize vignettes by stating what the cases “clearly show,” thereby informing audiences of the intuitive response that is expected. We wondered if such language could influence peoples’ reactions to the cases. To test this possibility, we presented subjects with two versions of three well-known thought experiments in philosophy. In one version, the vignette was bracketed in language similar to the language used in the original philosophical presentation. In another version, the exact same vignette was presented with language suggesting the case revealed something radically different; indeed, a claim diametrically opposed to the original exposition.

Our findings suggest that there is indeed an influence that comes from the way philosophical cases are introduced and described (i.e., “framed”). Our studies revealed an influence promoting conformity with the suggestive framing language. We explain these findings and various dimensions of this important issue.